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Abstract
The failure of communications systems may cause catastrophic damage to human life and economic activities as people
are unable to communicate with each other in a timely manner and with a convenient quality of service. Therefore, the
exchange of information is more than necessary for people in their everyday life or during harsh environments to pre-
vent the death and injury of thousands of individuals. The study of communications systems behavior in harsh environ-
ments helps to design or select more resilient technologies that are capable of operating in challenging conditions. This
article reviews existing approaches, major causes of failure, and weaknesses of communications systems during extreme
events. First, we highlight the importance of communications systems, and then we examine related works, how commu-
nication may fail, and the effect of this failure on human life in general and during extreme events response.
Furthermore, we study and analyze how communications are used during various stages of extreme events, and we iden-
tify the main weaknesses and limitations that communications systems may suffer based on many case studies. To con-
clude, we identify and discuss relevant attributes, requirements, and recommendations for communications systems to
perform with a suitable quality of service during harsh environments and to reduce risks of communication failure in
challenging conditions.
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Introduction
Calamities, defined as generally unplanned events that
cause significant losses, have become a common occur-
rence, consistently taking the lives of thousands of peo-
ple. Extreme events in many parts of the world have
caused serious damage to goods and led to significant
trauma for affected people and their loved ones.
Natural disasters (ND) cause serious deterioration of
social and economic activities, ranging from habitation
to nutrition, health facilities, communications systems
(CS), power supply, and transportation. During harsh
environments (HE), the provision of direct and indirect
support for human needs is a substantial challenge.1
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It is difficult for people to deal with hard circum-
stances that take place during natural or man-made
disasters. Disaster management encompasses several
operations such as immediate response, recovery, miti-
gation, and preparedness for decreasing the effect of
future calamities. Rescuers require fast and efficient
access to information for effective disaster management
(DM) processes. Extreme events may hit a wide area,
and therefore, many organizations may be involved in
rescue operations, involving government and voluntary
organizations working together as a single team to help
the injured, save lives, and protect facilities.2
HE create significant immediate challenges for
authorities in many fields. Indirect damages are also set
in motion by a catastrophe, such as social problems,
economic pressures, loss of tourism, a drop in industry,
and so on.3 As extreme events increase in frequency,
they strike different countries in various ways: develop-
ing nations suffer from high quantities of victims and
hard economic losses, while developed countries are
able to reduce losses due to their use of best practices
and efficient infrastructure.4
In such circumstances, the most important goals are
saving lives, goods, and all necessary infrastructure for
extreme events mitigation as quickly as possible. Doing
so may allow for quicker rescues and reduce the impact
of anxiety on victims.1 During the first 72 h after a
ND,5 rescuers are more likely to save lives of victims,
and fast evaluation of losses is required. CSs are essen-
tial during this period to support the exchange of infor-
mation between entities such as humanitarian
organizations, communities, and governments.
Importance of communication systems in HE context
Technology is so integrated into everyday life for the
majority of people that the development of a society or
country is proportional to its progress in information
technology (IT).6 Recently, communication technology
(CT) has evolved dramatically and CSs have become
essential, not only for basic communication but also to
have access to media, services, and data supplied by
companies, organizations, government, and so on.7
The role of telecommunications infrastructure (TI) is
not only limited to people’s daily routine as described
earlier. During HE, they also provide a way for people
to declare their safety or verify the safety of their rela-
tives through emergency calls and priority phone lines.
They also afford essential communications services in
order to keep critical government services such as police
and health care running. In extreme events, CSs pro-
vide fundamental response and recovery activities as
they help connect victims to relatives, rescuers, and
relief organizations in the aftermath of extreme events
or crises.8
Reliable and accessible CSs are also important to a
community’s resilience as they afford important options
for people, government, and relief organizations to deal
with risks during HE. Immediately preceding cata-
strophe, telecommunications are used to broadcast
warning information about what is happening. Then,
people are able to take action in order to prevent or
reduce the effect of these calamities. Therefore, it is
obvious that CSs play a critical role in disaster warning,
management, and alleviation. During ND like earth-
quakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis, traditional means of
communications such as fixed or wireless phones might
be damaged.9 Thus, each country must prepare alterna-
tives for such situations so that DM organizations can
respond quickly and efficiently. Thus, DM teams must
be skilled and provided with the latest CSs to assess
losses and damages, and coordinate their operations in
the affected areas.
ND such as the earthquake in Haiti and the tsunami
in Japan or attacks like the September 11 terrorist
attack in New York have demonstrated the importance
of CSs in preventing losses and coordinating relief
actions. In the aftermath of crisis, responder teams
such as volunteers, firefighters, security staff, and
health care personnel are sent quickly to the damaged
zone. Robust CSs must always be ready to use, espe-
cially during the early response time after a crisis as
they are essential to saving lives.
Rapid technological advances allow for greater effi-
ciency in dealing with the effects of crises by reducing
impact on human life as well as social and economic
activities, protecting and supporting facilities, and get-
ting medical help to the injured. Each stage of DM
(preparedness, response, mitigation, and restoration)
requires its own technological solutions.1 Many areas
such as space technology, modern CS, health care and
diagnostics, artificial intelligence, green energy, and
remote-controlled robots are useful in DM operations
for rescue and relief efforts.
Communication breakdown effect
The failure of CS is widely known to occur in almost all
extreme conditions. The breakdown of TI, whether
complete or partial, causes inefficiency and delays in
emergency relief efforts and response, which leads to
loss of life and preventable injuries.10 Due to increasing
dependence upon CS during extreme events, the risk of
communication failure is high, despite increasing immu-
nity and protection of these means against disasters,
HE and calamities. An extreme event situation with a
severely disrupted TI amplifies chaos and uncertainty.
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Poor communications between responders can severely
hamper assessment and relief efforts, and prevent
affected populations from connecting with responders
and relatives.5
During DM actions, information and instructions
may be transferred through a long series of organiza-
tions, before arriving at the right destination. As an
example, pictures, real-time video, and other pertinent
inputs related to the damaged areas are sent from res-
cuers to their management offices and other remote
command centers. Similarly, relevant data and instruc-
tions are sent from headquarters to command centers
and then to rescuers.2 Effective DM necessitates robust
CS to provide a continuous exchange of information
between rescuers and remote command centers. Any
failure or disconnection of this can generate disorder of
disaster response operations.
Furthermore, the damaged area may become iso-
lated by the total or partial failure of CS. In this case,
the ability to send reports, information, or data to the
outside world or remote headquarters will be reduced.
For example, during a tsunami, we need to send infor-
mation related to the disaster everywhere, even to unaf-
fected areas, in order to broadcast early warnings and
ensure evacuation from crisis zones. Moreover, we risk
losing time during the 72 golden hours immediately fol-
lowing a disaster, the time period when we are most
likely to save lives.3 By using efficient CS, we are able
to send first response teams quickly to rescue the popu-
lation of the affected area.
Communication failure may occur in the majority of
extreme event scenarios which provoke loss of lives and
properties.11 Also, the damage to CS along with the
increase in traffic crossing the network disrupts relief
operations. Thus, rescuers are not able to exchange
information and people cannot communicate their posi-
tion or ask for assistance, and the entire relief operation
is hardly managed.12 Besides physical damage, the
remaining CSs are inadequate to handle the increased
need to make calls as the network becomes overloaded
by the huge number of communication attempt.13
Coping with crisis
Over the last few years, calamities have caused, even in
developed countries, extreme events that may easily
collapse CS.10 In such contexts, the needs of rescuers
and the affected population are directly proportional to
the amount of diversity and elaboration of the network
infrastructure, as it increases dependence on these sys-
tems along with the risk of failure and losses. However,
modern CSs can equally supply efficient and effective
ways to help governments to deal with challenging
conditions, and quickly reestablish affected economic
and social life. Over the past few years, the evolution of
CS has led to the development of innumerable services
and applications based on the Internet such as video
streaming and sharing, cloud services, social media,
and so on. Social media applications are a particularly
good example, as they were useful for checking the
safety of people in the aftermath of a disaster when
CSs were destroyed or overloaded and it was hard to
communicate by phone or text messages. In addition,
these applications were highly efficient as users are able
to make posts online to propagate and obtain informa-
tion about the crisis.7
Yet the application of technologies during HE has
revealed serious inefficiencies that have challenged
cooperation between rescue teams. For example, in
2004, after Hurricane Katrina, communication tools
were seriously damaged, resulting in serious challenges
for victims and first response teams.14 In addition, a
few minutes after the explosion of a fireworks depot in
the Netherlands in 2000, which destroyed a significant
proportion of a city, the GSM (Global System for
Mobile communications) network overloaded and went
out of service.3 Many other examples prove that current
CSs have various weaknesses and limitations that may
hamper and challenge emergency response. Important
weaknesses are physical destruction, lack of compatibil-
ity between technologies, and the congestion of CS.
Furthermore, restoring connectivity, even temporar-
ily among rescue teams, is a critical goal for helping res-
cuers to report their inputs and synchronize their
actions.13 Because quick repair of CS during golden
hours may boost operations, there is a need to install
flexible infrastructure that is able to restore connectivity
immediately. The advanced technology used for DM
may support relief organizations and provide necessary
feedback for any action to take during catastrophes.
In addition, CT was integrated into the DM process
a long time ago, as efficient CSs are important to a
community’s resilience.9 Furthermore, the use of CT is
essential during the four phases of DM: preparedness,
mitigation, response, and recovery. Also, information
and communications technologies (ICT), which have
had significant progress recently, help to integrate
many CSs together. Hence, the use of CT in DM is also
growing.
Challenges restoring communication
There are serious challenges during the deployment of
CSs under extreme conditions.13 First, the system must
operate without knowing any previous information
about its environment; thus, the installation and con-
figuration must be done on the fly and as quickly as
possible in order to restore, strengthen, or substitute
the failed part of the infrastructure. Second, CSs must
be scalable, resilient, and energy efficient to deal easily
with unknown conditions and limited battery life of
many devices; thus, CSs have to be installed on demand
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in full conformity with current needs and required loca-
tion. Third, as many entities are concerned in the rescue
operations, CSs should interoperate with heteroge-
neous technologies; the goal is to support various stan-
dards and devices, so that all responders will be able to
communicate together, coordinate operations, and
receive requests from affected populations. There are
many other challenges that we will examine in detail in
this article such as reliability and robustness to support
critical requirements, flexibility to self-organize when
architecture changes in order to minimize delays, and
facilitating the deployment of components without
needing existing TI.
Research objectives
Despite the benefits of modern CS to society, failures
of TI present serious consequences and risks due to
increasing dependence upon these instruments. This
article addresses weaknesses and limitations of CS that
can cause ineffective performance, low communication
quality of service (QoS), or even dysfunction during
extreme contexts. To begin, we examine the impact of
the utilization of CT during HE, in addition to causes
of communications failure. Then, a special focus is
given to the relationship between recent extreme events
and telecommunications in order to review previous
failures and successes and identify the attributes and
characteristics that CS should have to improve perfor-
mance and QoS of communications during HE
contexts.
The remaining portion of the article is arranged as
follows. In section 2, a review of the literature is pre-
sented. In section 3, telecommunications usage during
extreme conditions is examined. In section 4, case stud-
ies of the utilization of CS during several challenging
contexts are presented. In section 5, we discuss and
identify recommendations based on the previous sec-
tion. In section 6, attributes that modern CSs should
have are introduced based on many case studies and
previous examples. We finish this article by the conclu-
sion and next steps.
Related works
The importance of communications during disasters
has been a major area of study over recent years with a
number of research papers published highlighting the
need for reliable means of communication in all DM
stages. In this section, we depict related work and pin-
point the contribution of this article. Ferris and Petz15
review the major ND that have hit various regions of
the world and discuss their effects on society. Another
one16 examines, in detail, a design process for CS to be
disaster tolerant and gives best performances during
the crisis. Rautela and Pande17 highlighted the
problems and issues that can occur if people are not
well prepared for DM. The Guidebook1 provides assis-
tance for governments, professionals, and volunteers to
find convenient solutions for many difficulties occur-
ring during ND. Townsend and Moss10 have detailed
the need for CS during the disaster recovery process.
Schryen and Wex18 examined solutions for risk eva-
luation and mitigation provided by information systems
research in ND management. Brown and Mickelson19
discussed a framework to investigate appropriate ICT
to use in limited resource areas, mostly rural areas.
Fragkiadakis et al.20 have proposed a scalable network
platform that provides a common architecture for inter-
operable and heterogeneous networks during cata-
strophes. Miranda et al.13 surveyed possible alternatives
for critical communications by deploying a network
without any previous information about the communi-
cations environment. Gomes et al.21 did a survey of
wide regional failures and solutions for achieving resili-
ent routing, including disaster-aware routing. Saim
et al.12 examined the utility of cognitive radio technolo-
gies for emergency communications response and con-
firm that they are very convenient to fulfill the hard
requirements of these systems.
Bartolacci et al.22 described parameters to conveni-
ently choose the location of mobile network base sta-
tions and other communications equipment in an
affected area. The article11 sets out the architecture for
solving the problem of filtering or prioritizing for lim-
ited bandwidth of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. Wang
et al.23 discussed how smartphone systems work effec-
tively in a disaster through the use of embedded sensors
and emergency applications.
Srinivasarao et al.24 completed a survey of emer-
gency CS architectures including warning processing
and transmission network architectures. Premkumar
and Jain14 examined some specifications to improve the
efficiency of a CS during relief operations in the after-
math of a disaster. Leah Davis and Robbin25 examined
some causes of communication failure during the
response to Hurricane Katrina. They also studied how
failures of communication, management, and informa-
tion sharing reduce network organizational effective-
ness. In survey, Wang et al.23 depicted and displayed
communication system architectures, research chal-
lenges, and performance specifications for intelligent
power system management. Markakis et al.,26 exam-
ined many new challenges that emergency service provi-
ders will encounter with the arrival of 5G. Dial et al.27
were charged with evaluating current systems and
found areas of opportunity for improvement for Fujian
Province’s emergency systems. Channa and Ahmed2
surveyed proposed frameworks for emergency commu-
nications response and possible security requirements
to provide a secure and efficient exchange of
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information. Li28 identified several challenges to deploy
the emergency warning CS.
Discussion
As modern life is completely dependent on CT, the pop-
ulation can be more vulnerable when communication
fails. Thus, the importance of communications has been
a major area of study over recent years with a number
of research papers published highlighting the need for
reliable means of communication during extreme events
contexts or daily activities. Their principle aim is to help
provide people with their basic needs and activities, in
addition to communicate with rescue teams and their
relatives. According to our survey, most of the papers
focus on specific technology or specific issues in CT, or
how to adapt CS according to a particular context.
During extreme events, many aspects are concerned in
the use of CT for mitigation and response efforts, such
as technical, social, procedural, and organizational. It
was difficult to find a publication that dealt with all of
these aspects by reviewing many disasters in order to
find weaknesses and limitations to address the decrease
of communications’ QoS during HE.
Paper contributions
According to our knowledge, there is no detailed study
that takes into account the usage of CS during many
types of extreme events at the same time. Existing
research papers have examined a single case in detail, or
they focused on characterizing and dealing with a spe-
cial context that may occur during HE. Our objective is
to illustrate approaches, weaknesses, and limitations
that may take place while using CS during extreme
events in general in order to address the decrease of
communications’ QoS and propose resilient solutions
for CS during HE. Our goal to provide reliable solu-
tions for CS was based on the following idea: if a CS is
reliable and efficient during challenging environments it
will probably perform even better during normal condi-
tions. To validate our findings, we studied many
extreme events based on various criteria such as man-
made or natural; whether affected countries were devel-
oping or developed; type of event, such as earthquake
or tsunami; affected areas are rural or urban; and conti-
nents like Asia or America; and we considered temporal
distribution in order to cover the digital era revolution
up to current days. Then, we extracted the characteris-
tics that such systems must have in order to provide a
convenient and resilient communication QoS. These
characteristics have been deduced according to a deep
literature study of many papers that had examined
recent extreme events to identify the technological
weaknesses to be overcome. We will try to address some
of these weaknesses through future research for reliable
CS by comparing all common modern CT without
prior judgment of which one is best suited. In brief, this
article provides the following main contributions:
 Examine technologies and approaches taken to
deal with CS failures during several extreme
events.
 Illustrate standards, actions, and recommenda-
tions proposed by specialists and commissions to
strengthen the resilience of CS.
 Provide an analytical global study of CS weak-
nesses and limitations based on a deep analysis
of many extreme events contexts.
 Identify relevant attributes and requirements
that CS should have to ensure a good communi-
cation QoS by taking into account many case
studies in addition to practical, technical, con-
textual, social, and procedural realities. Best-sui-
ted CT will be selected through future research
by using these attributes.
Disasters and telecommunications
The impact of natural extreme events
Natural or man-made disasters are frequently occur-
ring, especially in recent decades as we can see in
Figure 1. They also bring serious human losses of
many tens of millions of victims, see Figure 2; equally
economic losses exceeded hundreds of billions of dol-
lars, see Figure 3. As an example, the earthquake of
Haiti alone claimed 230,000 people’s lives in 2010.30
Although, in the aftermath of a disaster, the affected
zone is in chaos. Let us take the earthquake that has
hit Japan in 2011 as an example. It had 9.0 magni-
tudes, followed by a tsunami of 23 m high and accom-
panied by a nuclear crisis; as a consequence, already
well-trained emergency response specialists and the
world were dazed. By synthesizing consequences of
many large-scale disasters, we obtain following con-
clusions:5,7,25,30–33
 The collapse of buildings and infrastructures:
Besides the high human cost of extreme events
that exceeded hundred millions of people, Figure
2, they additionally made many people homeless
and waiting for help. Also, damages to economic
activities and infrastructures’ destruction caused
the raise of total economic losses of many hun-
dred billions of dollars in recent years, Figure 3.
 Paralysis of traffic in the damaged zone: Even
remaining circuits were congested due to huge
disaster response or evacuation of vehicles.
Thus, external aid like disaster response workers
and goods transportation is difficult to flow in
damaged areas.34 Also, airports may be
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damaged, and as no plane could land, external
aid could not be provided immediately during
the golden 72 h. However, we still able to use
helicopters to transport some limited resources,
but the difficulty level of disaster response is still
complicated.
 Paralysis of entire CS: The remaining networks
could not be used due to traffic congestion or
power outages. Then, the information about
damages and needs in the damaged areas can
hardly be accessed. Thus, without a clear
understanding, it is difficult to allocate available
resources efficiently and appropriately. Hence,
the misplacement of disaster relief goods makes
it impossible for victims, and human cost rise.
 Lack of professional disaster response workers:
Their number is poorly sufficient, especially at
the beginning of disasters when numerous local
voluntary workers are to get involved in disaster
response.
 Dysfunctional administrative command system:
Every level of this system may be paralyzed, and
Figure 1. The number of global reported ND events. This includes those from drought, floods, biological epidemics, extreme
weather, extreme temperature, landslides, dry mass movements, wildfires, volcanic activity, and earthquakes.29
Figure 2. Global total number of people affected by ND. This is defined as the sum of the people who were injured, affected, and
left homeless after a disaster.29
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the remaining system may be prevented from
assuming the greatest responsibility of disaster
response planning and administration.
 Bad coordination: The efficiency of rescue activi-
ties was low because there were no common
communications tools between the workers.
Also, poor communication causes interference
with emergency response actions. Hence, emer-
gency response operations were slow and many
loosed lives could have been saved.
Losses and consequences due to telecommunication
failure
Over the last decade, 3852 ND have killed 780,000,
affected 2000 million people, and cost at least
US$960,000 million.4 ICTs are unavoidable in the pre-
diction, detection, monitoring, and warning of the
occurrence of ND. They also have a critical role during
disasters’ responses by providing efficient information
exchange for entities concerned in recovery and rescue
actions. Thus, emergency CSs are essential to all DM
phases, namely, detection and prediction, warning, and
relief operations.
To illustrate the importance of CS, during an earth-
quake in 2010,5 when fuel was in short supply, the
available stock was distributed only to local emergency
services. The local operator was, therefore, not able to
replenish its emergency generator fuel and many sites
stopped functioning. Because telecommunications were
not considered as an essential service, critical CSs were
disrupted and the coordination of relief efforts was
severely hampered.
Consequences of CS failure prevent efficient
response in the aftermath of a disaster. Also, rescuers
are more concerned to prevent any additional life
losses, than reduce damage to properties and infra-
structures. Relief operations may be severely delayed or
paralyzed if the responding organizations are unable to
communicate with each other and effective coordina-
tion becomes more complicated. In such time-sensitive
situations, the loss of few minutes may reduce the gap
between death and life for people in need for rescue.35
Even if rumor is not risky in the same way as a delay in
response efforts, however, it is able to establish a seri-
ously confused environment. With the imbalance of
communication channels, conflicting information
about damages can spread panic and rumors at a situa-
tion when planned acts are necessary for efficient and
quick relief.
In the literature, we can find many examples of loses
due to communication failure such as the survey in
Cole and Hawker.36 It was reported also that during
the northwest wildfire, first responders were not
informed that the wind had shifted and the fire turned
toward them.37 The main challenges include the loss of
communication and the lack of compatibility between
CSs. The incapacity of emergency organizations to
coordinate and communicate may cause catastrophic
consequences on human life and properties as was men-
tioned in the fire of Okanogan Complex in August
2015.38 To demonstrate these necessities, just examine
the terrorist attacks of the World Trade Center (WTC),
where 121 firefighters died due to the missing radio
interoperability between police’s radios and their
devices.37 The Virginia Tech shootings and the Katrina
hurricane also proved the necessity of CS
Figure 3. Total economic cost of damages as a result of global ND in any given year, measured in current US$, includes those from
drought, floods, biological epidemics, extreme weather, extreme temperature, landslides, dry mass movements, extraterrestrial
impacts, wildfires, volcanic activity, and earthquakes.29
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interoperability and collaboration between implied
agencies.39 In addition, in Sri Lanka, the tsunami
caused the death of over 34,000 people due to the lack
of an early warning system; there was sufficient time to
evacuate coastal population if information about the
coming disaster was available.40 While in the case of
extreme events, physical damage is unavoidable, in
many other cases, the human death could be avoided if
convenient measures and precautions had been taken.
As in the case of Indian Ocean tsunami in December
2004, it provoked losses of over a quarter of a million
deaths.40
How CS fails during disasters
During disasters, TI may fail through a variety of rea-
sons. Many investigations demonstrate the main three
reasons for CS failure:41,42
 Destruction of CS components
 Damage of supporting infrastructure
 Congestion
Each of these three reasons will be examined in detail
in the next sections.
Physical destruction of network infrastructure. CSs are cru-
cial to disaster response, but during the crisis, they
could be easily paralyzed. The principal reason for
communication failures may be physical damage of CS.
Hurricane, flood, and earthquakes can all create signifi-
cant damage to towns and their vulnerable communica-
tions components.35 Physical damage can be also
extremely expensive and time-consuming to restore as
it may require maintenance or replacement of complex
hardware, particularly if essential components such as
cell towers or cables are concerned.
The weakness of telecommunication networks (TN)
is due to the lack of a high degree of redundancy.10 For
example, fixed phone network architecture is conceived
in a way that the simple loss of a fraction can instantly
disconnect all neighborhoods. The New York 2001
attacks damaged a major routing center, isolating large
parts of lower Manhattan from the telephone network.
Yet, new ‘‘packet switched’’ technologies, such as the
Internet, are more resilient to physical destruction,
thanks to increased redundancy and advanced routing
techniques to bypass destructed parts. Such networks
can support serious damage before certain parts
become out of service. However, in spite of its resili-
ence, the Internet still vulnerable because it is installed
through the old and nonredundant telephone and cable
television networks copper wire in many parts of the
world. Also, cable damage can be harder to repair as it
is hidden underground; hence it may take a huge time
just to locate the exact location of the damage.41
Although, wireless networks are highly variable in
their vulnerability to physical node destruction and
resulting loss of service.10 For example, if a cell tower is
severely damaged, in addition to the major service dis-
connection in its area, it will remain a serious problem
as it is hard and costly to replace. Wireless links are also
likely to be disturbed or damaged, as signals of different
wavelengths can be extenuated by snow, heavy rain, or
fog. Also, the transmitter itself can also be damaged or
misaligned with its receiver.35 Broadcasting services are
extremely vulnerable as they are generally centralized at
the metropolitan level. For example, the destruction of
the WTC, which was the location of many TV and
radio stations, has disconnected the broadcast services
of many media stations. New architectures of wireless
networks are more and more decentralized; the cell
phone network is centralized at little scale in larger cit-
ies. Hence, the destruction of the base station may dis-
turb service only in a small zone.
Like the majority of urban infrastructures, TN may
be damaged in nearly all important disasters. Yet, it is
not the scale of the disaster, but how the location of
damages may coincide with the old and new communi-
cation facilities that are the determining factor.
Although these problems may be less costly and less
difficult to correct, they can be a serious challenge to
relief efforts if they remain during the first 72 h of a
disaster.35
Disruption in supporting infrastructure. Breakdowns caused
by supporting infrastructure tend to be much more pre-
valent and detrimental to response and recovery
efforts, even if they are less common than outages
caused by physical damage. The electrical distribution
network is the major supporting infrastructure for CS
because electrical energy is needed for the operation of
the majority of modern communication devices. Thus,
power outages and insufficient fuel for power genera-
tors are the main reason for stopping CS.30 For exam-
ple, during the power outage of 2003 in the
northeastern United States, mobile phone services
failed as most antenna sites were powered by only 4–
6 h of battery backup.
In addition, after an Earthquake on 2010, a local
operator reported that only 16% of base stations in the
affected region were rendered inoperable. However, just
28 h later, about 86% of base stations became inoper-
able and the cause was a power failure. In addition,
after the Japan tsunami in March 2011, approximately
8000 mobile base stations were immediately disabled.
Within 24 h, this number almost doubled when backup
power systems became exhausted. These power outages
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were responsible for 85% of mobile communication
breakdown during that time.5
While power systems are the major supporting infra-
structure for CS installations, cooling systems are also
critical and may fail independently of the power sup-
ply.10 Finally, transport failures can also affect the fuel
supply for backup generators. On September 11 New
York attacks, the main communication device for a ser-
vice provider was put offline due to a power failure and
bad diesel fuel supply at the same time.
Disruption due to congestion. Even if physical components
subsist after a disaster, CS can disrupt due to conges-
tion. The consequence is temporarily the same as the
failure is by physical damage. To understand the effects
of congestion, just think about the road traffic if all
vehicles are put together at the same time; surely, they
will not be able to move. Abrupt peaks of traffic in
circuit-switched networks, such as landline phones,
may block the communication, but it can be restored
relatively rapidly. However, in a packet-switched net-
work, the consequence is simply performance degrada-
tion. As for SMS (short message service), the message
will always be sent but will be late depending on the
scale of the congestion.43
However, failures caused by congestion will progres-
sively disappear as users change their communication
behavior. In the meantime, congestion restricts voice
traffic by 70%–95%, although packet traffic is only
limited by 0%–30%.44 In New York in 2001, both
fixed and mobile communications experienced signifi-
cant overload. Mobile phone networks recorded a 92%
blocking rate, with call volumes increasing 10-fold.4 In
addition, the congestion caused by the peak of calls to
verify the safety of people has induced a call restriction
of 80%–90%.
CS in disaster recovery
This section highlights the role of CS in all phases of
disaster recovery. These phases are organized as
follows:4,5,10,24,45,46
 Disaster warning
 Emergency response
 Restoration and repair
 Reconstruction
 Redevelopment
We will try to understand the role and potential fail-
ures42 of TI on each phase.
Disaster warning. Before a disaster, the principal mission
of emergency communications is disaster notification.24
Efficient warning and appropriate evacuation process
allow individuals and communities to react accordingly
to a threat and decrease the risk of injury, death, and
goods damage. Communities need multiple channels of
communication to ensure the reception of alert infor-
mation, and the dissemination of knowledge and aware-
ness. They are no single system that can be used in all
situations; an efficient warning system should employ
many channels of information and should be in a state
of permanent readiness. Two types of communication
methods are available for alerting:46
Mass methods: sirens, conventional radio, television,
and so on.
Addressable methods: cellular mobile, telephone,
Short Message Service, fax, paging, and so on.
The warning procedure can be detailed as follows: at
first, sensors monitor their environment and send peri-
odic information to a data center. The transmission
may be done by wire lines, satellite, or wireless commu-
nications. In this center, received data are analyzed and
processed; humans monitor the result 24 h a day to
make a decision to issue or not a disaster warning. If a
warning is to be issued, then the information is distrib-
uted to individuals in the disaster area by all possible
means. Finally, technical efforts involve how warnings
can be effectively distributed across the existing com-
munication infrastructure with slight modifications to
existing systems, without the need for human
intervention.24
CS during emergency response. Emergency response activ-
ities begin nearly once a disaster has started. This
period is characterized by doing immediate relief activi-
ties such as injured rescue and evacuation. During an
emergency, official public safety systems are the most
important CS.10 Those systems supply first responders
with the possibility to assess damages and coordinate
their operations efficiently. Although they are prone to
failure, these networks can supply basic voice services
to support communications during an emergency.
In wide-scale disasters involving the response of sev-
eral agencies, civil networks have become an essential
means of emergency communication. This is due to the
incompatibility of equipment used by response organi-
zations, impeding interagency communication between
stakeholders.24 Also, civil networks offer greater data
communication capabilities than their counterparts in
public security. At the beginning of the emergency
response, in case of damage to the communication
infrastructure, the provision of communication capabil-
ities is the first priority in the delivery of material relief.
Also, amateur radio (AR) are generally easy to
repair; thus, they can be the first CS to be restored.47
Following the 2004 tsunami, AR were the only
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communications link in some islands in the Indian
Ocean.10 Nongovernmental organizations carry the
majority of the relief operation activities, and they suf-
fer providing their own CS. New infrastructure-less
technologies, such as ad hoc,24 were produced to pro-
vide easy and fast communications. For example, dur-
ing the New York 2001 attacks, messaging devices like
RIM Blackberry were massively used to deliver mes-
sages from the WTC.10
CS during restoration and repair. This phase begins after
the urgent life-saving operations; it is characterized by
the clearance of debris from principal streets to reestab-
lish basic transportation and communications capabil-
ities. CSs allow better management of debris clearance,
restoration of basic access to streets, more efficient
information reporting, and best coordination with
other efforts. Restoration of CS is relatively fast; the
failure induced by congestion gradually decreases as the
order is reestablished and the requests for communica-
tions are reduced. Also, providers have become very
agile in their response to physical damage. After the
destruction of a major switching facility in the WTC on
New York attacks, AT & T’s reaction was so fast that
many of its vehicles were stopped at Manhattan ports
of entry; even if the company was ready, the officials
were not.10
In developed nations, where populations have easy
access to technologies, CSs are an efficient tool for
quickly restoring social and economic activities back to
normal. The Internet has changed the way of repair and
restoration functions, as it offers many alternatives to
send and receive information. After the 2004 tsunami,
various charities collected over $500 million via the
Internet in less than 3 weeks. Released in less than 72 h,
these funds could be allocated to relief efforts much
quickly, as organizations had to receive funds by mail
in the past.10 During this phase, CS must be repaired
quickly to support continuous relief and recovery
efforts, even if it is more likely to be damaged compared
with other facilities. After the New York attacks, the
telephone provider was able to recover service to the
New York Stock Exchange in a few days by transfer-
ring material from other sites to replace over 3 million
disconnected lines.10
Wireless technologies are widely used to quickly
recover communication services. After New York
attacks, many point-to-point wireless links were used to
reestablish connection of Manhattan Financial District
in New Jersey and Brooklyn. These links were installed
in few days and they have been widely accepted as a
permanent backup.4 Rapidly deployable cell nodes
have been broadly adopted to reestablish mobile service
in almost all major disasters. Also, the extended
deployment of Wi-Fi with other unlicensed wireless
technologies facilitates the supply of communications
to critical relief operations without significant cable
installations.
CS during reconstruction. This phase can be described by
the restoration of people and economic activities to the
same levels before calamity.10 IT replacement is highly
required during this phase because they participate sig-
nificantly to support other redevelopment activities.
While rebuilding cable networks can be long and costly,
wireless technologies offer faster and more flexible
alternatives. For example, the reconstruction of Iraq’s
damaged IT, after the war, underlines the benefits of
using wireless technologies to reduce the time required
for infrastructure replacement. The reconstruction of
mobile cellular services was one of the first important
contracts made by the occupation authorities.10
CS during redevelopment. This final step is a longer opera-
tion that may take several decades, but involves impor-
tant projects for future growth and development. The
transition from the previous step to the current one also
offers an essential new thinking about how TN are built
and managed.10 These activities aim at preventing
losses in future disasters and resolving weaknesses
discovered.
Warning systems generally receive attention and
major efforts to improve their efficiency. Greater atten-
tion is also given to reduce congestion in case of emer-
gency and to prioritize calls of public officials and
disaster responders. The importance of mobile net-
works in providing inter-organizational communication
to coordinate complex response operations has induced
important investments. Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) is essential as a mean of communication in
emergencies involving the defeat of CS components or
congestion. The redevelopment of CS has highlighted
redundancy as an indispensable way to deal with the
risk of physical damage.
Case studies, failures, and successes
In this section, we will analyze some disasters in order
to identify failures and successes related to the usage of
CS during extreme environments. Case studies were
selected if they resulted in significant damages to
human life and economic activities in affected areas.
Our main criteria will be how physical destruction, dis-
ruption of supporting infrastructure, and congestion of
communication infrastructures were addressed during
each disaster under examination.4,5,7,8,11,25,31,36,37,41,43,46
In the upcoming section, we will summarize important
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elements in a table in order to select major attributes
that CSs should have to satisfy the needs of usage dur-
ing extreme environments.
New York City WTC attacks, 2001
On the morning of September 11, 2001, two hijacked
commercial aircraft struck the WTC towers in New
York and another was flown into the Pentagon in
Washington, DC. The towers of the WTC collapsed
shortly after, producing many casualties and over-
whelming property damage. The roof of the WTC was
a major wireless site for cellular wireless services,
Internet service providers (ISP), and radio-TV broad-
casting services. Thus, cellular services were disrupted;
ISP points-of-presence (POPs) were destroyed; and the
coverage of many TV and radio stations was limited.
The emergency management office for New York City,
headquartered at the WTC, lost its entire command
center. The loss of the command center created a major
crisis for the city’s overall emergency response as it was
the supposed coordinator of emergency response
between all agencies.
In addition, WTC building 7 collapsed and its base-
ment power supplies were flooded, putting out of ser-
vice over 1.5 million lines serving the financial district
due to cuts of subscriber cables.48 Immediately in the
first few minutes after the attack, New York 911 call
centers received 3000 calls. There was serious conges-
tion of telephone networks across the east coast with
New York City’s mobile networks experiencing a 92%
blockage rate due to high call volumes.49 Inter-agency
communications were restricted by interoperability
missing between technologies. When police services rea-
lized that towers were collapsing, they ordered police to
leave the site, whereas fire officials were not notified as
there was little communication between the two depart-
ments. Hundreds of firefighters died when the towers
collapsed because they did not receive the warning.50
Fortunately, a month before the attacks, the govern-
ment emergency telecommunications service (GETS)
became fully active with priority given to wired calls
offered to national security and emergency users.
Following the attacks, their success ratio was over
95%.48 In addition, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) had issued an order before the
attack for mobile network operators to prioritize com-
munications of officials working on emergency and
security as it was done for wire lines. Unfortunately,
this option was not ready. Since then, the Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) has been installed to offer this
service.4 Immediately after the attack, mobile operators
deployed many cellular towers on wheels to replace
damaged infrastructure in order to provide critical
phone services for rescue teams and other emergency
governmental agencies and improve coverage in the
overloaded area. The mobile service was also important
as many passengers and crew members of the hijacked
aircrafts made cellular phone calls to family or notified
the authorities about what was happening.49 AR was
very important in facilitating communications between
emergency organizations, in addition to satellite
phones.50 Also, wireless service and Wi-Fi were avail-
able in the bus that served as a mobile operations cen-
ter. The Internet had not been seriously affected, even
if New York had a major Internet delay. News sites
such as CNN were strained; hosts became inaccessible
immediately after the attacks, but the network recov-
ered in about an hour.49 Electricity was lost in much of
lower Manhattan for almost a week, and 2 days later,
backup power failed at the New York International
Internet Exchange.4 The 9/11 Commission advised cre-
ating a way for police and firefighters to communicate
together during a crisis. Congress approved a law
allowing the FCC to reserve many broadcast frequen-
cies for public safety purposes. The FCC called the new
network FirstNet.48
Indian Ocean earthquake 2004
On December 2004, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit
the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, generating tsu-
nami waves with maximum heights ranging from 2 to
30 m that began inundating coastlines of 12 countries
in the Indian Ocean ranging from Indonesia to South
Africa. The disaster impact was very high, becoming
one of the deadliest ND, with approximately 300,000
dead and missing and 1,700,000 displaced with India,
Sri Lanka, and Indonesia suffering the most extensive
losses. Economic damages exceeded $13 billion, affect-
ing many economic activities such as fishing, agricul-
ture, and tourism, as well as physical infrastructure,
residential and commercial structures, community
institutions.
The disaster was so large that tsunami waves
destroyed villages, roads, and a large portion of coastal
infrastructure. Thus, a large amount of humanitarian
aid was needed because of shortages of food and water,
and economic damage.51 Military resources were the
only way to give aid to the worst damaged areas in the
early stages of the crisis. While disaster response was
poor, immediately following the tsunami, relief opera-
tions continued to suffer from lack of coordination. In
addition, volunteers and officials were either insuffi-
ciently trained or ill-equipped to cope with such a
disaster. With the high population density and tropical
climate of the affected areas, avoiding epidemics
became a priority. However, thanks to the quick
response in providing appropriate facilities and ser-
vices, this was minimized.34
Although this crisis was the first global Internet-
mediated ND, CT were not put into their full capacity
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in the face of such catastrophe.51 Therefore, the deliv-
ery of humanitarian aid went slowly due to CS fail-
ures.31 Principal reasons for communication damages
were the destruction of TI, accumulated debris, and
extensive flooding that affected the power systems and
cabins that contain the Base transceiver station (BTS)
equipment.43,51 In some cases, the cabins collapsed, and
in other cases, the towers were damaged by waves.
Furthermore, the power supply was disconnected from
the main grid and complete restoration of damaged sta-
tions took many days by replacing generators, relocat-
ing cell sites, or sharing infrastructure.43 Limited road
access was the main obstacle to sending the engineering
teams to fix damaged equipment and refuel the genera-
tors. In Indonesia, for example, where 67% of roads
had been damaged prior to 2004, the tsunami increased
the percentage of damaged roads to 72%, which ham-
pered relief and recovery operations.34 In addition,
there were other telecommunications shortcomings
such as limited network coverage, lack of disaster warn-
ing systems, and rescue equipment.
Consequently, two main objectives came into
focus:31 first, to reestablish CS to facilitate and coordi-
nate relief operations and, second, to exchange and
effectively use resource technologies, including satellites
and the Internet by harmonizing activities between con-
cerned organizations. Connectivity to all basic facilities,
such as police, DM centers, and hospitals, was
restored. Wireless phones and satellite communications
were provided to relief organizations. After a few days,
fiber optic, copper cables were fixed and telephone ser-
vices were provided for free to transmit urgent
information.43
This analysis demonstrates that thousands of deaths
could have been saved if damaged countries had effec-
tive warning systems in place, but unfortunately, there
was no such system.46 Meanwhile, the Pacific Tsunami
Warning Center in Hawaii detected the earthquake on
the other side of the world and an alert was communi-
cated to warning centers across the Pacific. Alerts were
sent to 26 countries within 15 min after the earthquake,
but it took additional minutes for alerts to be broadcast
by radio and TV stations. Although the tsunami was
identified, this information did not reach people at the
coast because there was no established CS to deliver the
warnings to the communities at risk.34 Effectively com-
municating timely warnings through communications
infrastructure in the developing world is a particularly
challenging problem. This disaster motivated the cre-
ation of a tsunami early warning system for the Indian
Ocean that became operational in the spring of 2006.4
As we see, failures in disasters detection have serious
consequences, but false alerts also cause bad outcomes.
As an example, an evacuation in Hawaii due to a false
alert would cost over $68 million. Hence, for effective
disaster preparedness and mitigation, many actions
have been taken for disaster warning:4,31,34,43,46,51
 Creation of a tsunami early warning system for
this zone.
 Dissemination of tsunami warnings by the instal-
lation of manned and unmanned supervision
towers.
 Backing up initial warnings by AR network to
transmit warning information.
 Improvement of the availability of backup power
supplies.
 Use of technologies to redirect calls.
 Provision of predesigned guidelines for emer-
gency deployment.
 Improvement of network operators’
cooperation.
 Finding more resilient network architecture.
 Diversifying and backing up a principal network
with the use of other CT such as AR and satellite
terminals in strategic locations.
 Activation of national roaming and priority call-
ing during disasters.
 Dissemination of alert messages through reli-
gious establishments.
 Increase participation in hazard detection by
improving telecommunications access and the
capacity of emergency call centers to deal with
spikes in calls produced by hazards. Thus, the
variation of call profiles can be an additional
source to detect hazard information.
 Provision of training to help officials use their
CS effectively for disaster cooperation and
warning.
Haiti earthquake 2010
A catastrophic 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit Haiti on
Tuesday, January 2010, causing major damage in the
region. The damage was severe and catastrophic, thou-
sands of buildings including housing, hospitals, schools,
and even the parliament and many government build-
ings were destroyed. Unknown numbers of people were
trapped; 316,000 people died; 300,000 injured; over
1,000,000 people left homeless in the streets; and 3 mil-
lion people were affected.41 Among the dead are mem-
bers of parliament, many government officials, and
international humanitarian workers. President Preval
was saved, but he was not able to communicate with
his officials as the presidential palace collapsed, and he
later worked from the police headquarters. The relief
operations were extremely difficult due to the loss of
officials and facilities, with water and electricity com-
pletely unavailable, the transport network blocked or
collapsed, and the main control tower of the airport
and the main port also suffering significant damage.52
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TI and power were severely damaged; the public
telephone system was out of service and all mobile cel-
lular providers were affected by the collapse of build-
ings and towers. Over 20% of cellular service provider
infrastructure had collapsed.53 International cable link
and microwave connectivity were damaged. Search and
rescue operations for survivors were top priority but
severely constrained by damaged communications.41
The government requested urgent relief including many
medical units, electricity generators, and communica-
tions equipment to coordinate response efforts.52
Radio and TV broadcasts, posters, web solutions,
loudspeaker trucks, and word of mouth were all used
for information exchange. As a high proportion of
Haitians owned mobile phones, relief operations had to
find communications options based on mobile technol-
ogy.54 It was difficult for mobile network operators to
provide equipment and staff to repair the damage, as
they were not considered a humanitarian priority. The
installation of Cells on Wheels (COWS) or Mobile
System and Telescoping Antenna Array outside many
telephone centrals in multiple places were used tempo-
rarily to provide communications.53 In addition, Cisco
Tactical Operations deployed much-needed networking
equipment with data, voice, and wireless options. The
team worked to rebuild damaged infrastructure and set
up WiMAX links to back up the fiber connection until
it could be repaired. This team also provided a video
conference system for the government.41 After the
restoration of the service, the wide number of calls
overloaded the CS; as a result, services were kept closed
except to some trusted organizations.43
This was the globally computerized relief operation,
because of the destruction and congestion of majority
TI. Thus, IP communications were the unique alterna-
tive for responders to use during operations.41 Social
media and Internet tools were used for coordination
and rescues, and a public web-based map was devel-
oped to share needs, as well as places where help was
available in real time.53 Donations could be made by
SMS, and OpenStreetMap and Google Earth upgraded
their maps to reveal updated information.52 Facebook
and Twitter were overwhelmed by demands for help.43
SMS was very useful to help locate and rescue vic-
tims for many reasons: it is available on any GSM net-
work; it is one of the first services to be restored; it uses
a minimum of network resources; and SMS messages
can be stored on mobile phones and sent when a net-
work becomes available.54 Also, a system was conceived
where victims could send the SMS short code 4636
including information about damages, and describe the
help they needed. Messages were inputted automatically
into a database, which volunteers then processed using
online tools to classify and distribute information
appropriately.41 The huge number of SMS also caused
network congestion and loss of service,54 as many
targeted mobile phones were not available as they had
been lost or were powered off. The networks were,
therefore, overloaded with large numbers of SMS mes-
sages, which could not be delivered.
Eastern Japan earthquake 2011
In March 2011, millions of people in Japan were alerted
about the earthquake by mobile phone networks, radio,
and TV. It occurred in the Pacific Ocean and it was the
largest in Japanese history with a magnitude of 9.0.
Shortly thereafter, the population was alerted about the
tsunami, which was wider than expected with waves
reaching a height of over 40 m and traveling 10 km
past the coastline in some places. This caused cata-
strophic damage: about 19,000 deaths and approxi-
mately 370,000 houses were damaged. Damage was
estimated at $210 billion, with nuclear power centers
badly damaged and supplies of electricity, gas, and
water cutoff.4
Fixed telephone services were severely impacted with
385 damaged buildings, 90 transport routes destroyed,
and 6300 km of aerial cables and 65,000 utility poles
damaged. This resulted in the deterioration of over
1.9 million landline phones, which account for around
8% of lines.4 Damage to mobile telephone service was
estimated at 29,000 mobile base stations, which repre-
sent about 22% of those in the affected region.43
Underground facility damage was 0.3% compared to
7.9% for aerial installations.7 The earthquake and the
tsunami produced about 20% of the damage but 80%
of buildings were put out of service due to power
outages and the inability to refuel generators. External
communications were slow due to the cutoff fiber optic
and submarine cables by the tsunami. In all, 120 TV
and 2 radio relay stations were also put out of service.4
Congestion caused usage restrictions of 80% to 90%
of landline calls and 70% to 95% of mobile phone
calls. The Internet was still accessible as the packet traf-
fic restriction rate was only 0%–30%,7 but in the hard-
est hit areas near the Fukushima nuclear plant, satellite
phones were often the only option available to commu-
nicate.43 Text messages were more likely to reach their
destination, with some delay, as packet traffic was
largely unrestricted. Social media was used extensively
and Twitter was widely employed to exchange informa-
tion and help people stay connected.55
After analyzing the causes of service interruption fol-
lowing the catastrophe, the Information Communication
Council and many network operators proposed many
solutions to improve the resilience of CS during emer-
gency situations:4,7,43,55
 Use buried cables instead of aerial cables.
 Increase battery and fuel backup for important
installations.
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 Provide backup for important BTSs.
 Geographically distribute important CS items.
 Manage network traffic and congestion by
adhering to restriction control guidelines.
 Introduce call length limits and phone calls with
reduced sound quality.
 Diversify CT used such as the use of wireless and
wired communication.
 Avoid network congestion by using voice mes-
sage service instead of voice calls.
 Develop services and applications to share infor-
mation and verify the safety of persons.
 Promote basic communications services required
by relief operations and reduce the priority of
other video services.
 Develop and build energy efficiency and alterna-
tive energy sources.
Nepal’s earthquake 2015
On April 2015, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8
struck central Nepal, leaving catastrophic damage
across the country. It was the largest in over 80 years to
strike this country.34 The main ground shaking lasted
for 2 min and was followed by many other aftershocks
in the months after the event, the biggest with a magni-
tude of 7.3. The human cost of the crisis was huge with
more than 9100 dead and nearly 25,000 injured.56 In
addition, property damage was catastrophic: an esti-
mated 605,254 of houses were totally destroyed;
288,255 were partially destroyed; thousands of official
facilities such as schools, hospitals, and government
buildings were impacted; and many historical buildings
were destroyed.57 Furthermore, it was reported that 16
hydropower facilities were significantly damaged,
which represents approximately one-fifth of the total
power supply. The transport network across Nepal was
heavily impacted, with more than 2000 km of damage
which represent 13% of the network. Many interna-
tional aircrafts were diverted to airports in neighboring
countries due to the level of international assistance
arriving at the capital’s small airport. Because of this, it
took hours and days for international relief crews and
equipment to arrive in Nepal. The earthquake induced
significant losses in neighboring countries such as
India, Tibet, and Bangladesh. The total economic cost
was estimated at US$5.1 billion with additional eco-
nomic losses valued at nearly US$1.9 billion for Nepal
alone. This value is equivalent to more than one-third
of its entire gross domestic product.34
Before this earthquake, the government had a his-
tory of failing to respond appropriately to the disasters
and two earthquakes that hit the country in the past
century, demonstrating government inefficiency. In
addition, 82% of people who live in rural areas are
already facing many economic, social, and health
challenges; after this disaster, they found themselves
even more exposed to these stresses. Nepal’s geography
posed significant challenges to building roads from cit-
ies to remote areas. Furthermore, cell phone reception
has been essentially limited to line of sight due to hills
and mountains that cover about 83% of Nepal, which
often blocked cell signals. While it is possible to build
repeaters to expand signal coverage, it is difficult for a
poor country like Nepal to do so as it ranks 157th out
of 187 countries on the United Nations’ development
report.58
In addition, daily power outages were up to 12 h a
day before this crisis, despite having more than 2% of
all global water resources, which could generate about
83,000 MW of hydropower; enough to turn Nepal into
an electricity supplier.59 Following the disaster, cata-
strophic damage to the power distribution network has
kept hundreds of thousands of people in the dark.
Restoration of electricity took about a month in urban
cities and even longer for rural villages. This situation
combined with weak country circumstances and com-
munications challenges severely complicated recovery
efforts in thousands of remote rural villages.
TI failed to successfully survive the earthquake, with
damage covered cell towers, radio stations, power
sources, and Internet connections. In addition, network
backhaul infrastructure mainly aerially installed fiber
optic cables and microwave links, and 20 of the 50 FM
radio stations went off service for approximately
3 days.60 However, the state-owned radio continued its
broadcast for 24 h a day within days after the disaster,
with the main focus on disaster mitigation and public
service announcements. These damages obstructed the
exchange of information to rural areas such as relief
aid time and location and safe practices. Moreover,
unpaved roads and fragile facility buildings made get-
ting information to rural areas extremely challenging,
and in some cases, word of mouth was the only means
of communication. That means for isolated villages
with weak signal coverage were separated not just phy-
sically but even in terms of communication. The esti-
mated damage to the telecommunications sector was
valued at $17.4 million. Unfortunately, 1 month fol-
lowing the earthquakes, relief efforts were still unable
to contact survivors and transmit life-saving
information.61
While the earthquakes hit everywhere indiscrimi-
nately, communications were restored ineffectively. The
Nepali government did not have a plan for emergency
communications to help coordinate relief workers and
organizations in the face of this level of destruction.
Moreover, the majority of relief operations were based
in the capital city; therefore, efficient communication
they needed was difficult to provide because cell towers
were down and radio stations are non-functional. As
this earthquake was the worst recent ND, it is
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important to look deeply at the use of CT during this
crisis to provide a brief background of its evolution
and role. The main means of communication used fol-
lowing the earthquake were60–64 mobile phones ham
radio, the Internet, radio, television, newspapers, and
direct contact.
Mobile phones. Mobile phones were used by 92% and
84% of people in urban and rural areas, respectively.
Immediately after the earthquake, use increased signifi-
cantly as they were an important medium to exchange
information. They were used mostly for calls, SMS,
alerts, listening to the radio, accessing social media,
and the Internet. Service quality degraded during disas-
ter due to three main reasons: congestion, lack of elec-
tricity to charge mobile phones, and trouble finding
places to replace cellular towers.
AR. Amateur or ham radio was very successful in con-
necting rescuers to survivors. Coverage was limited in
Kathmandu since there are not many operators in
Nepal. For future disasters, the government is working
on training the police force in using this technology to
back up mobile communications during disasters.
The Internet. The Internet was very useful in mostly
urban areas when other means of communication was
damaged. After the earthquake, Facebook and Twitter
were flooded with requests for help. Moreover, The
International Red Cross and tech companies intro-
duced tools to check the safety of people online, but
their effectiveness was limited by the inability to
recharge devices due to power outages and Internet
connectivity problems.
Radio. Before the earthquake, radio was listened by
around 45% of people. Its usage was less frequent
immediately after the quake, but 64% of people took
action based on information received from the radio.
The utilization of this service was affected by damaged
radio transmitters, damaged radio sets, not owning a
radio set, lack of electricity, and so on.
Television. About 42% of people in rural areas and
almost 80% in urban areas have access to television.
However, access to television dropped to 31% after the
quake. Its use decreased for three main reasons: lack of
electricity, fear of living inside the house, and television
channels disseminating unreliable information.
Newspaper. Newspaper circulation is mostly limited to
urban areas. During the disaster, distribution channels
were lost due to damaged roads; however, many people
who had access to the Internet got their news from
online newspapers.
Direct contact. Around 20% of people considered direct
contact as their main source of information before the
earthquake. After the earthquake, it was very slow;
however, it was the most trusted form of communica-
tion in rural communities. The earthquakes had
destroyed many villages’ roads making travel very slow
and unfavorable for relief workers.
Many preparations have been made for the next
disaster in light of experience:
 Installing earthquake early warning sensors, with
alerts sent out using phones, radios, and sirens.64
 Police using AR during disasters.61
 Visiting and assessing the vulnerability of com-
munications towers and rebuilding or reinforcing
them as necessary.
Discussion
In Table 1, we summarized case studies according to
the following criteria: causes of CS failure, affected ser-
vices, used technologies, weak points and limitations,
and recommendations. We chose case studies going
from the beginning of the digital era, the 9/11 New
York attack, to the early days of the Nepal earthquake.
In addition, we selected events which caused enormous
damage to human life and economic activities in
affected areas including a terrorist attack, earthquakes,
and tsunamis. Also, we chose countries across several
continents with varying profiles of wealth, technology
penetration, and development. Our aim was to diver-
sify our samples in order to get a global background
on the use of CT during HE.
The September 11 attacks were a case of a man-
made extreme event in a developed country where CT
was abundant. This event revealed the importance of
coordination between all organizations responding to
the crisis, given that improved interoperable communi-
cation could have been the key to prevent the deaths of
many firefighters. Also, this crisis exposed the conges-
tion of communication tools as an important weakness
as it blocked the communication even if physical dam-
age was not important.
The Indian tsunami is an example of a large-scale
event that hit many countries, which are mainly under-
developed with already weak communications and
transportation infrastructure. Main weaknesses were
revealed such as the lack of an efficient early warning
system and advanced CT, and the inefficiency of
regional and international cooperation in the communi-
cation of warning information and response. Although
it was one of the deadliest event with very high
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economic losses, the impact could have been reduced if
the warning information had been communicated
quickly to the coastal population. Even though the
earthquake was detected, the tsunami was not detected
in time; thus, people were not able to benefit from the
time difference between the earthquake and the tsunami
to seek safety. Even if the tsunami had been identified,
early warning information did not reach the coastal
population because there was no established CS to
deliver warnings to the communities at risk. This is a
common and larger problem affecting all underdeve-
loped countries in the world.
The Haiti earthquake is an example of a large-scale
extreme event that hit a poor country, in which damage
was severe and catastrophic, with electricity, water,
transportation, and communication completely dis-
rupted. Coordination was particularly difficult because
many Haitian government officials, parliament mem-
bers, and international aid personnel died. This event
was the first mostly information data-driven relief
response, due to the destruction and congestion of the
majority of communication facilities, so IP communica-
tion was the only option for the responder to use as the
core of the response. Internet and social networking
applications, like Facebook and Twitter, were used to
provide rescue and coordinate operations. SMS mes-
sages were used to help locate victims and to make
donations. Web-based maps were developed to share
needs and places where help was available. Also,
OpenStreetMap and Google Earth revised their maps
to reflect up-to-date disaster information.
The Japan earthquake was a three-in-one disaster,
with an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis at the
same time. It is the biggest earthquake in Japan’s his-
tory and provides an example of how a developed
country dealt with such a situation in the digital era.
The earthquake was detected and the tsunami warn-
ing system alerted people shortly after. Nuclear power
plants, TV and radio stations, fixed and mobile tele-
phone services, and external communications were
severely damaged. Congestion caused high usage
restrictions, and text messages were more likely to
reach their destination. Proposed technical solutions
issued at the end of this crisis can be used all around
the world for efficient disaster preparedness and
response.
The last case was the 2015 earthquake in Nepal,
which was the largest in over 80 years to strike the
country. The earthquake hit everywhere indiscrimi-
nately, leaving catastrophic damage across the country;
the human and economic cost was huge. Infrastructure,
transport, facilities, and communications were dam-
aged. This crisis was a typical case of a governmental
failure during extreme events: communication was
restored ineffectively, daily power outages were up to
12 h before this crisis, and the large rural population
was already badly linked to the capital where the major-
ity of relief operations were based. Also, hills and
mountains, which cover about 83% of Nepal’s land,
posed significant challenges to building roads and often
blocked wireless communication signals.
In Table 2, major damages that may occur to CS
during examined extreme events are outlined. In the
majority of extreme events, loss of electricity and lack
of fuel for generators have been principal reasons for
losing communication by putting telecommunications
equipment out of service. So, it is important to provide
an autonomous power supply and enough fuel for gen-
erators as electricity failure may last for a long time.
Also in the majority of disasters, significant damage
occurred to infrastructure. Thus, installing equipment
in safe places where they are far from risk may decrease
the failure of CS. For example, putting equipment in
physically higher locations and avoiding basements
could reduce the effects of flooding. Also, the use of
aerial facilities or cables should be avoided in favor of
buried solutions, and critical equipment should be
as geographically dispersed as possible. Moreover,
communications providers should ensure redundancy
and backups for critical systems, in addition to imple-
menting interoperable systems and diversified access
technologies such as satellite, TETRA, GSM, and
WiMAX. Diversity must include multiple backhaul
link by using satellite, wireless, and undersea cables in
order to preserve connectivity if principal link fails.
Operators need to embrace mesh topologies to provide
redundancy routes and reduce the risk of network
failure.
Table 2. Damages to communication networks during examined disasters.
New York 2001 Indian Ocean 2004 Haiti 2010 Japan 2011 Nepal 2015
Congestion
Physical damage
Disruption of
supporting
infrastructure
Fully applies Partially applies Does not apply
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The impact of extreme events is different between
rural areas and cities. For example, transportation
within metropolitan zones hit by a disaster can be diffi-
cult, making the shipment of communication equip-
ment impossible in the majority of cases. To address
this risk, resilient telecommunication towers can be
built in some strategic locations. In small cities or rural
areas, infrastructure installed could be rebuilt in its
original location, or a more accessible location could
be chosen. The human impact varies depending on age,
disability, and language with elderly and disabled peo-
ple being particularly vulnerable as they require assis-
tance in taking the right action during the crisis in their
own language. Impact also varies depending on the
country, where developed countries have better infra-
structure, technology, communications, management,
and preparedness utilities, which reduce human loss
and facilitate life-saving action. In contrast, poverty
and poor governance in less developed countries ham-
per the effective mobilization and use of all available
alternatives.
TN congestion is mainly caused by calls made by
affected people asking for emergency relief, or trying to
contact relatives. Therefore, it is necessary to use some
tactics to alleviate congestion such as increasing net-
work resources; diversifying communication means;
reducing call hold times and sound quality; designing
CS architectures that can deal with traffic surges; imple-
menting congestion control algorithms for the Internet
to reduce load during congestion; prioritizing the use of
some applications and services that require less band-
width such as SMS and email restricting the use of
video streaming for urgent use only; giving special privi-
leges to some users, such as relief organizations to make
calls during disaster situations; and using packet-based
communication like the Internet.
In the beginning, the use of IT was limited for relief
organization. In a very short amount of time, technol-
ogy has exploded and the use of the Internet and social
media like Facebook and Twitter is widespread during
extreme events to facilitate rescues and coordination.
Public and private entities concerned with response
activities are broadly deploying DM software. Web-
based maps and applications were developed to share
road conditions and places where help was available in
real time. SMS is a powerful tool to exchange informa-
tion as it can reach its destination during congestion
due to the low bandwidth required; making a donation
and sharing location and other information are effi-
cient applications based on SMS during crisis time.
In some cases, loss and damage could be avoided if
an efficient warning system were available. A warning
system requires sensors to monitor, and provide digital
data about environmental circumstances that help pre-
dict events such as earthquakes or tsunamis within a
specified margin of error. It is important to diversify
means of dissemination of alerts and public informa-
tion after a disaster. For this aim, we can use many
means, such as TV or radio, mobile networks by cell
broadcast service, social media or web services, sirens
or loudspeakers, and video screens, in public places to
inform people about hazards or other information such
as evacuation procedures. In other words, warning or
emergency information must be as close as possible and
as easily reachable as possible to vulnerable popula-
tions for efficient DM. The time elapsed between detec-
tion of extreme event signs and the event itself is the
time when the existence of a convenient warning system
can be effective. This time differs according to the type
of hazard to detect from tens of seconds for earth-
quakes to hours or weeks for hurricanes. The impact of
early warnings may vary on the local, regional, or glo-
bal scale. The coordination of early warning system
operations requires a network of establishments or
organizations. The importance of an efficient warning
system is well known in order to preserve communities,
lives, and infrastructure.
Attributes and characteristics
Inadequate CS capabilities can have catastrophic con-
sequences on extreme events response efficiency, and
data exchange during challenging conditions.5
Communications during extreme events require high
performance, resilience, flexibility, message prioritiza-
tion, fast delivery, and other capabilities that we will
detail in this section. Depending on the type of extreme
event, its context, and concerned individuals, weak-
nesses of CS can be quite different and actions taken to
protect life and property can be different also; for
example, a fire alarm’s siren is not sufficient in a deaf
school. However a CS that is able to operate during
extreme conditions will be able to performe very well in
normal conditions. The deployment of CS during HE
must fulfill some specifications in order to offer and
preserve reliable communications services.13 Generally,
the best-known requirements for CS during hard condi-
tions mentioned in the literature and that we can
deduce in light of previous case studies are as fol-
lows:13,23,30,36,65–68
 Robustness and reliability: This is the ability of
CS to provide and maintain core functions and
services just as it would perform in normal cir-
cumstances. To do so, CS must supply basic ser-
vices in challenging environments and afford
quick service restoration. Also, CS should be
robust against certain node failures, since the
reception of certain information in a timely and
accurate manner can be critical to saving human
lives. For example, data-driven communication,
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like the Internet, proved markedly robust against
congestion.
 Provided service: Voice is the principal service
of a traditional CS. However, individuals may
also need to exchange maps, images, and other
relevant data in addition to having an Internet
connection and real-time transmission.
Furthermore, in specific cases and for rescue
purposes, it might be recommended to support
video streaming.
 Automation: Automatic organization and opti-
mization help decrease the human contribution
in CS administration and enhance its reliability.
Also, it may minimize the time needed for initial
configuration or manual reconfiguration if envi-
ronmental conditions change. Furthermore, sys-
tem topology can be adjustable, and bandwidth
is allocated according to the need of users.
 Mobility: This condition concerns the mobility
of users and the network itself. Mobile infra-
structure may facilitate deployment, optimiza-
tion, and installation of the CS. Also, system
architecture can be adapted to the concerned
area or in order to improve performance. User
mobility also allows for emergency personnel to
communicate while moving within the damaged
zone, as disasters may affect wide geographical
areas.
 Interoperability: The deployed CS should be
compatible with various technologies in order to
expand the covered zone and diversify available
services when needed. This attribute is also very
essential for information exchange between dif-
ferent organizations, as each one may have its
own equipment. In this way, individuals may be
able to transparently connect and exchange data
through substituted infrastructure regardless of
the technology they have. For example, IP net-
works can be used as a communication protocol
between various emergency teams.65
 Rapid deployment: As relief personnel are most
concerned with reducing the number of victims,
CS planning is mostly done on the fly and it is far
from being formalized. Thus, the deployment
process must be simple and easy with no need for
specialized personnel or complex procedures.
Equipment must be tolerant of the harsh environ-
ment and rapidly deployable, which involves rude
manipulation due to the lack of time required for
rescue operations.
 Scalability: This is the ability of CS to expand
geographical coverage and the number of users
supported efficiently. Therefore, CS must be auto-
mated to avoid service disruption in case of envi-
ronmental change.
 QoS: This is the ability to prioritize and categor-
ize traffic, such that high priority traffic gets pri-
ority to guarantee delivery of urgent messages in
case of congestion. QoS also includes parameters
such as availability, throughput, latency, jitter,
and error rate. Depending on compatible ser-
vices, the network may support video streams
and live audio with adequate requirements. For
example, VoIP calls may require a maximum
packet delay of 100 ms, jitter of less than 30 ms,
and packet loss of less than 1%.12
 Security: Multiple agencies and possibly military
forces may be implied in the disaster response.
Therefore, sensitive data crossing CS could be
exposed and should be appropriately protected
and encrypted.28 This level of security guaran-
tees that only authorized persons can access the
information, and each entity receives the infor-
mation intended for it only. For example, medi-
cal records should be available to the medical
teams only. Security can also include data integ-
rity, authentication, and access control.2
 Cost: CS cost should be reasonable for deploy-
ment, maintenance, and equipment. As resources
are mostly used during basic and essential life-
saving activities, low-cost CS can be easily
deployed in low-resource developing countries.
 Energy Efficiency: CS should be designed to
work as energy efficiently as possible in order to
keep the system’s infrastructure available for a
long time. As we have already seen in our case
studies, power outages are common in the major-
ity of disasters due to infrastructure damage, fuel
shortage, or simply battery discharge. An effi-
cient energy system can last longer in such cir-
cumstances, most importantly during the golden
first 72 h.
 Localization: The current location of a user can
be required for emergency context; therefore, a
CS must have the ability to automatically obtain
the current location of its users.
 Popularity: Popular technologies such as cellular
could be used because most people are accus-
tomed to them. They have to be user-friendly as
relief personnel and victims are more focused on
life-saving activities. Furthermore, popularity
allows for the possibility of deployment with less
training or technical expertise, which is benefi-
cial as human resources are less available in the
damaged area in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster.
 Capacity: The CS must support a sufficient num-
ber of users and overcome traffic congestion.
 Coverage: This is the ability of CS to cover a
wide area without the need to deploy many
points of presence. This property can be
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characterized by the maximum distance a user
can reach while still connected. The coverage
can reduce the cost and time of system deploy-
ment by reducing the amount of infrastructure
required to cover the damaged area.
Conclusion and future work
The relevance of CS is undeniable for information
exchange and operations coordination during HE, in
order to prevent damage to human life and economic
activities. Moreover, if CSs are designed so that they are
able to operate with a good QoS during challenging con-
ditions, their operation in normal conditions will be
more robust and reliable. At the beginning of this work,
we gave an extensive introduction to the reciprocal effect
of HE and CT on each other. Also, we examined related
work and how QoS of CS may fail or decrease, and the
effect of this failure on human life in general and
extreme events response. Then, we studied how commu-
nications are used during HE and gave an overview of
the main weaknesses and limitations that CSs may suffer
based on many case studies. Also, we detailed relevant
attributes that CSs should have to perform well. These
attributes will be useful in our future research to select
best-suited CT for a good communication QoS. A deep
understanding of CS behavior during HE, such as smart
cities, rural areas or disasters, is essential to design or
select more resilient technologies that are able to operate
well in challenging conditions and perform with a good
QoS during normal environments. In future work, we
will continue our search for reliable CS and address
some of weaknesses found during this article by compar-
ing most relevant modern CT without prior judgment of
which one is best fitted. A framework to select the right
CT according to relevant attributes of a special applica-
tion or service will be proposed.
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